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New Evidence on Housing Wealth and Consumption Channels 
 
Abstract 
This paper provides new evidence on the effect of housing wealth on consumption by focusing on 
the impact of home-equity extraction. We develop a household consumption decision model to 
illustrate the differential effect of home-equity extraction, relative to net home equity, on 
consumption. The home-equity extraction channel is also shown to vary with household-level 
borrowing constraints. Based on U.S. household survey data and an instrumental-variables 
approach, our empirical results validate model predictions. We find that the marginal propensity 
to consume is two times higher for the home-equity extraction channel relative to the conventional 
housing wealth effect. The consumption effect of home-equity extraction is more than 2.5 times 
greater for liquidity-constrained households than for unconstrained households. These results are 
even more pronounced in the case of durable goods consumption for constrained borrowers. 
JEL codes: E21, R22, G21 
Keywords: Consumption; housing wealth; home-equity credit; liquidity constraint  
 
1. Introduction 
Housing wealth and its impact on consumption has recently garnered widespread attention in the 
literature. Two channels that underlie the co-movement between home values and consumption 
have been studied: the conventional housing wealth effect and the collateral effect. The housing 
wealth effect suggests that households may feel wealthier as a result of their rapidly appreciating 
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home values and, consequently, spend more on consumption. In contrast, the collateral effect 
focuses on the role of home equity as loan collateral: Rising home values can impact a household’s 
spending by allowing them to borrow against their home’s value via home-equity credit or cash-
out refinancing. The goal of our study is to use micro-level data and examine, more explicitly than 
previous studies, the channels through which housing wealth impacts consumption. In doing so, 
we present innovative theoretical and empirical evidence. The results of our study enable us to 
better understand the channels through which housing wealth impacts consumption, as well as the 
effect of borrowing constraints on these channels.  
 
The literature demonstrates general agreement that fluctuations in house values significantly 
impact consumption; however, the effect of home-equity extraction is largely unknown. Empirical 
evidence regarding the housing wealth effect on consumer spending—and the collateral effect in 
particular—varies significantly, and ranges from virtually no impact to overly large. For example, 
using Danish household data, Leth-Petersen (2010) studies the impact of an exogenous increase in 
credit access on total household expenditures using a difference-in-difference method. He finds a 
statistically significant, yet only moderate, economic impact of the 1992 credit reform that enabled 
Danish households to use housing as collateral. In contrast, Cooper (2010) examines the influence 
of households’ home-equity extraction on the spending and saving behaviors of U.S. households 
over the period 1999–2009, and finds that a one-dollar increase in equity extraction increases 
household expenditures by up to 54 cents.  
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One challenge with these studies is the endogeneity between home-equity extraction and 
consumption. Endogeneity can arise from common macroeconomic shocks, financial planning, or 
both. For instance, good news about the future could lead to a higher level of both equity extraction 
and consumption and, as a result, appear to have a positive relationship with each other. To address 
this issue, the difference-in-difference (Leth-Petersen 2010) and Heckman two-stage regression 
(Hurst and Stafford, 2004) methods have been used in prior studies. In contrast, we use an 
instrumental-variables (IV) approach to study the impact of extracted home equity on consumption. 
State-level aggregate refinancing loan supply serves as an IV in the first-stage analysis. Our 
approach has certain advantages, which we discuss in the next section. We also conduct various 
robustness checks for instrument validity, including a falsification test. Consequently, our study 
contributes to the literature by more carefully investigating the relationship between extracted 
home equity and consumption.  
 
Another issue at stake is identifying to what degree households can extract from their home equity. 
Previous literature uses both extracted home equity (see, e.g., Hurst and Stafford (2004); Cooper 
(2010); and Fan and Yavas (2017)) and extractable home equity (see, e.g., Leth-Petersen 2010 and 
Browning et al. (2013)) as the measurements. Net home equity, which is the home value net of all 
mortgage indebtedness, provides an estimate of housing equity that can be, but has not been, 
converted into cash for expenditure. This is the extractable home equity, and it affects consumption 
by the perceived convertibility of home equity into cash. The underlying channel represents the 
conventional housing wealth effect. On the other hand, extracted home equity is the realized home-
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equity extraction through loan refinancing or other forms of home-equity credit. Extracted home 
equity is the increase in mortgage indebtedness since the first mortgage, and the expenditure 
stimulated as a result of this channel represents the collateral effect of home equity. In this paper, 
we provide new evidence on each of these housing wealth consumption effects (i.e., extracted 
home equity and extractable home equity). Our analysis is based on a household-level 
consumption decision model, and our predictions are validated by empirical results.  
 
Our study also seeks to address divergent findings in the literature that may be due to the different 
borrowing constraints households face. Specifically, we examine how housing wealth effects vary 
with household-level borrowing constraints. We do this from both theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. Since the early 2000s, the associated tax benefits of and low interest rates for home-
equity loans and lines of credit have contributed to the low cost of home-equity credit, which offers 
a feasible option for households seeking to smooth consumption during income shortfalls. In 
contrast, households without borrowing constraints can rely on liquid assets or other forms of 
credit for consumption. Although home-equity credit rates may appear low, accessing home-equity 
credit may incur significant costs, such as repayment penalties, closing costs, and lender search 
costs. For households that have limited access to unsecured loans, consumption is more likely to 
be financed through home-equity extraction.  
 
Our results, based on household survey data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for 
the period 1999–2013, show that extracted home equity significantly increases the marginal 
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propensity to consume (MPC) housing wealth. This effect—i.e., the collateral effect of realized 
extracted home equity—goes above and beyond the conventional housing wealth effect reflected 
by the extractable-home-equity-to-consumption channel. For instance, one dollar of extracted 
home equity is related to about an 8-cent increase in consumption, on average, while a one-dollar 
increase in extractable home equity is associated with only a 4-cent increase in consumption. The 
economic intuition is clear: There is a larger consumption effect for exercising the ability to 
increase debt than by simply having the option. We also provide evidence that liquidity constraints 
affect the channels between housing wealth and consumption. For liquidity-constrained 
households—which we define as having a lower proportion of liquid financial wealth, higher debt-
to-income ratio, or higher loan-to-value ratio—a one-dollar increase in extracted home equity is 
associated with an up to 30-cent increase in consumption. For unconstrained households, extracted 
home equity plays a limited role in stimulating consumption. This conclusion is further confirmed 
when we analyze durable and nondurable goods consumption separately. Durable goods 
consumption, which is typically financed by borrowing, is more sensitive to the amount of 
extracted home equity than nondurable goods consumption. This effect is even more prominent 
for liquidity-constrained households.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. 
Section 3 presents a household consumption decision model to analyze the effects of housing 
wealth on consumption and to differentiate the effects across channels. Section 4 describes the 
econometric setting and data. Section 5 reports estimation results and discusses their implications, 
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and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Measuring and Testing Extracted Home Equity—Related Literature  
The impact of housing wealth on household consumption has attracted extensive attention.1 
However, there is no consensus among researchers regarding the underlying channel for the co-
movement between home values and consumption. One strand of literature posits that similar to 
financial wealth, housing wealth affects consumption spending through the conventional housing 
wealth effect. 2  Another strand suggests that home prices impact total expenditures through 
improved collateral, rather than directly through wealth.3  
 
Several studies examine the empirical impact of home-equity extraction on consumption using 
aggregate data, and attribute the increased co-movement between home prices and consumption 
to financial liberalization (see, e.g., Greenspan and Kennedy (2008); Case et al. (2008); and Duca 
et al. (2012)). However, using aggregate consumption and wealth data may fail to capture (1) 
wealth distribution skewness and (2) spending-pattern differences across households. For instance, 
Guo and Hardin (2014) show that household wealth is related to differences in consumption 
patterns. Wealthier households—those with a potentially greater percentage of net worth in 
                                                        
1 For example, see Belsky and Prakken (2004); Kishor (2007); Case et al. (2008); Benjamin and Chinloy (2008); 
Bostic et al. (2009); Tsai et al. (2012); Abdallah and Lastrapes (2013); Guo and Hardin (2014); and others. 
2 For example, see Kishor (2007); Simo-Kengne et al. (2015); and Bostic et al. (2009). 
3 For example, see  Muellbauer and Murphy (1990); Iacoviello (2004); Aoki et al. (2004); Leth-Petersen (2010); 
Browning et al. (2013). 
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financial assets—are less likely to finance consumption through loans using housing as collateral.  
 
As a result of these issues, more recent studies tend to use household-level data to examine the 
collateral effect. A key issue at stake in this approach is identifying the degree to which households 
can extract wealth from their home equity. Some studies focus on the extractable portion of home 
equity, and do this with alternative measures of extractable home equity. For example, Browning 
et al. (2013) measure extractable home equity as unexpected innovations in house prices. Those 
authors find that total expenditures by Danish households were uncorrelated with unexpected 
innovations in house prices, indicating an insignificant consumption effect for extractable home 
equity. Leth-Petersen (2010) measures the impact of home-equity extractability on consumption 
by studying the effect of an exogenous increase in credit access on total household expenditures. 
He finds a statistically significant but economically moderate impact from using housing as 
collateral.  
 
Relative to extractable home equity, the realization aspect of extracted home equity provides a 
more straightforward measure of that portion of housing wealth that may directly affect 
consumption. As such, extracted home equity is the home-equity credit or mortgage that is 
potentially applied most directly to smooth consumption. Although extracted home equity is 
conditional on the actual net equity in the property, extracted home equity also reflects other factors, 
such as credit supply, household credit constraints, and the opportunity costs of—and, therefore, 
the willingness to—extract home equity. Consequently, some studies use total mortgage balance 
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or mortgage payment to measure extracted home equity. For instance, using U.S. household data, 
Guo and Hardin (2014) find that the mortgage balance has a larger impact on consumption than 
net home equity. Based on Chinese household-level data over the period 2001–2009, Fan and 
Yavas (2017) use mortgage payment to measure the extraction from home equity. That work shows 
that households with a mortgage consume a higher portion of their income than households without 
a mortgage. Other studies measure extracted home equity as the increase in debt since the first 
mortgage. For example, Hurst and Stafford (2004) find a significantly negative relationship 
between refinance loans and household wealth for those households with a high loan-to-value ratio, 
implying that liquidity-constrained households may use refinance loans to smooth consumption. 
Following Greenspan and Kennedy (2008), Cooper (2010) defines extracted home equity as the 
increase in household mortgage balance for non-movers or the decrease in home equity for movers. 
The results show a significant effect from extracted home equity on consumption. We follow 
Cooper’s definition in this study. 
 
Arguably, the various approaches to measuring home-equity extraction found in the literature have 
contributed to different conclusions regarding this channel. An additional concern is 
randomization. The extraction of home equity can be endogenous to a household’s consumption 
decision, which may be due to common macroeconomic shocks or a household’s financial 
planning. Consequently, the treatment of home-equity extraction may fail to randomly assign to 
households. So, for example, Leth-Petersen (2010) employs a difference-in-difference method to 
study consumption change related to an exogenous increase in credit access to home-equity 
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extraction due to the 1992 Danish credit market reform. However, there is no such regulatory 
change in the U.S. that enables quasi-experimental analysis. Hurst and Stafford (2004) use a 
Heckman correction to address selection bias. However, selection bias is only one form of 
endogeneity, and a Heckman correction may not be sufficient to address the potential endogeneity 
we describe. Therefore, in this paper, we adopt an IV estimation approach and rigorously address 
the instrument’s validity.    
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
In this section, we present a theoretical framework for understanding how housing wealth 
channels—and specifically the extracted home-equity channel—affect consumption. Our 
objective is to provide testable implications, which we will examine through our empirical analysis. 
 
We illustrate how extracted home equity affects consumption based on a two-period model. In 
addition, we follow Ogawa and Wan (2007) and incorporate the concept of cash-equivalent wealth 
(Guo and Hardin, 2014, Benjamin and Chinloy, 2008) and home-equity credit into the theoretical 
model.  The two-period model sets up as follows. Initially, the household has an outstanding 
mortgage balance (𝐷0), existing housing stock (H), and stock holding (𝑆0).
4 In period 1, the 
household incurs labor income and consumption denoted by 𝑌1 and 𝐶1, respectively. The house 
                                                        
4 We only consider homeowners, as home-equity credit is only available to homeowner. Thus, we do not include 
house-purchasing decisions for the households in this paper, and assume that the housing stock remains constant before 
the household sells the property at the final stage.   
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price in period 1 is 𝑃0, which is determined by the supply and demand in the housing market. The 
household obtains a secondary debt (𝐷1), which can be used to pay previous loan interest expense, 
consume, invest, or any combination. Alternatively,  𝐷1  can be used to replace the previous 
mortgage with a refinancing loan.5 We assume that all debts have interest-only payments. That is, 
the household pays the interest expense in each period and pays off the principal by the end of the 
next period.6 
 
In period 2, labor income 𝑌2 with cash equivalent wealth is entirely spent on consuming and paying 
off the outstanding debt.7 Our aim is to illustrate the channel through which the given amount of 
debt affects consumption expenditure. Consequently, and for simplicity, we follow Ogawa and 
Wan (2007) and assume that there is no uncertainty about future prices and interest rates.  
 
The budget constraint in the current period (period 1) for the household is given by:  
𝑌1 + 𝜆
𝑆𝑆0 + 𝜆
𝐻(𝐻𝑃0 − 𝐷0 − 𝐷1) + 𝐷1 =  𝐶1 + 𝜆
𝑆𝑆1 + 𝜆
𝐻(𝐻𝑃0 − 𝐷0 − 𝐷1) + 𝑟𝑑0𝐷0,  (1) 
where 𝑟𝑑0 is the effective interest rate for the initial mortgage 𝐷0, which includes origination fees 
                                                        
5 When 𝐷1 stands for a refinancing loan, the payoff diagram is slightly different from the home-equity loan. In this 
case, 𝐷0 is replaced by 𝐷1 in the beginning of period 1, at a refinancing mortgage rate of 𝑟𝑑1. 𝑟𝑑1 is normally lower 
than the mortgage rate for the original loan; however, origination fees, prepayment penalties, or closing costs can 
trigger  additional costs. By the end of period 1 there is no longer any 𝐷0; instead, the household pays the interest 
expense and principal related to 𝐷1. Such a change in the payment arrangement does not qualitatively change the 
results; the estimated partial derivative of 𝐶1 with respect to 𝐷1 is similar. A detailed derivation is available from the 
authors upon request.  I think the above change helps to clarify this issue. 
6 Other payment strategies do not qualitatively change the conclusion.   
7 We do not consider default in this study, and assume that households are able to repay all debts.  
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and other fees (0 < 𝑟𝑑0 < 1). 𝐷1 comes from the opportunity to borrow against home equity. 𝑟1 is 
the effective interest rate for 𝐷1  (0 < 𝑟𝑑1 < 1) , which includes origination fees, prepayment 
penalties, closing costs, and other fees and expenses. With extracted home equity, the household 
may immediately consume (𝐶1), pay the mortgage expenses (𝑟𝑑0𝐷0), or reinvest in stock (𝑆1). The 
effect of the secondary mortgage, 𝐷1, yields a consumption effect of extracted home equity, which 
is the part of home equity that has been replaced by cash.  
 
𝜆𝑆 and 𝜆𝐻 are cash-equivalent coefficients for stock holdings and home equity, respectively. Both 
have a value between 0 and 1 (Benjamin and Chinloy, 2008).  A higher cash-equivalent coefficient 
for housing assets implies that the household perceives a higher level of cash-equivalent wealth 
from home equity due to its convertibility to cash (Guo and Hardin, 2014). If market liquidity 
increases (e.g., transaction costs decrease or turnover increases), households will perceive a higher 
level of wealth. Both 𝜆𝐻 and 𝜆𝑆 will increase. If stock assets are fully liquid, 𝜆𝑆 = 1.  For housing 
assets, 𝜆𝐻 is usually less than 1. Home equity netting all debts (𝐻𝑃0 − 𝐷0 − 𝐷1)  reflects the 
amount of extractable home equity.  
 
At period 2, the household sells the house and stock to pay back the debt and consumes the rest. 
The household is subject to the following budget constraint:  
𝑌2 + 𝜆
𝑆(1 + 𝑟𝑠)𝑆1 + 𝜆
𝐻(1 + 𝑔ℎ)𝐻𝑃0 =  𝐶2 +  (1 + 𝑟𝑑0)𝐷0 +  (1 + 𝑟𝑑1)𝐷1,  (2) 
where labor income 𝑌2 , cash-equivalent wealth, and investment return are entirely spent on 
consumption and the payoff of all outstanding debt. 𝑟𝑠 is the stock return at period 2, and 𝑔ℎ is the 
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percent appreciation (or depreciation) of the house price at the second period. As we assume that 
there is no uncertainty about future prices and interest rates, 𝑟𝑠 and 𝑔ℎ are taken as givens. 
 
The household makes a lifetime consumption plan to maximize its intertemporal utility from 
consumption during the two periods. The utility function of the household is defined as:  
max      𝑈(𝐶1) + 𝛽𝑈(𝐶2)               (3) 
where 𝑈′() > 0  and 𝑈"() < 0 . 𝛽  denotes the discount factor. The household determines the 
consumption level in each period to maximize its utility, subject to budget and debt constraints. 
To maximize Equation (3), we have        
   
𝜕𝐶1
𝜕𝑆1
+ 𝛽
𝜕𝐶2
𝜕𝑆1
= 0,          (4) 
For the purpose of deriving the optimal consumption rule, we assume that the utility function of 
the household exhibits constant relative risk aversion 
𝑈(𝐶) =
1
1−𝛾
𝐶1−𝛾.          (5) 
where 𝛾 is the degree of relative risk aversion.  
 
By optimization, it can be shown that optimal consumption in period 1 is given by:  
𝐶1 =
1
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
{𝛹𝑌2 + 𝛹(1 + 𝑟𝑠)𝑌1 + 𝛹(1 + 𝑟𝑠)𝜆
𝑆𝑆0 + 𝛹(1 + 𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻𝐻𝑃0 + 𝛹(𝑟𝑠 − 𝑟𝑑1)𝐷1 −
𝛹[1 + 𝑟𝑑0 + (1 + 𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]𝐷0}         (6) 
with Ψ = (1 + 𝑟𝑆)
−
1
𝛾𝛽
−
1
𝛾. 
Equation (6) demonstrates that for liquidity-unconstrained households, current consumption is 
determined by the household’s cash-equivalent wealth, income, and extracted home equity. From 
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Equation (6), we observe that extracted home equity can affect consumption, which is defined as 
the collateral effect. The intensity of the collateral effect can be measured as follows:  
𝜕𝐶1
𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝐷1
=
𝛹(𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑑1)
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
.        (7) 
For liquidity-unconstrained households, as long as  𝑟𝑠 > 𝑟𝑑1 , consumption (𝐶1)  is positively 
related to extracted home equity (𝐷1). From Equation (7), it can be shown that the sensitivity of 
consumption to home-equity borrowing (
𝜕𝐶1
𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝐷1
) depends on the interest rate for the home-
equity loan (𝑟𝑑1). With a decrease in the cost of home-equity credit, borrowing against home equity 
becomes an important method for households seeking to finance consumption.  
  
Home equity can also affect consumption through perceived extractable home equity, defined as 
the conventional housing wealth effect. The partial derivative of 𝐶1 with respect to 𝐻𝑃0 − 𝐷0 −
𝐷1 measures the intensity of the conventional housing wealth effect:  
𝜕𝐶1
𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕(𝐻𝑃0−𝐷0−𝐷1)
=
1
1
ΞH
−
1
ΞD0
−
1
ΞD1
.        (8) 
with ΞH =
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
 , ΞD0 = −
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
  and ΞD1 =
𝛹(𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑑1)
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
.  
As shown in Equation (8), the sensitivity of consumption (𝐶1) to the home value netting debt 
depends on the extracted home-equity loan rate (𝑟𝑑1), initial mortgage rate (𝑟𝑑0), and housing price 
change (𝑔ℎ). It can be shown that with a decrease in 𝑟𝑑1 and 𝑟𝑑0, consumption is more sensitive to 
net home equity. The sensitivity of consumption to home equity is also positively related to the 
housing-price growth rate (𝑔ℎ). 
 
When the household faces a borrowing constraint (𝐷1 = ?̅?𝐻𝑃0 − 𝐷0), with ?̅? as the maximum loan 
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to value ratio (0 < ?̅? < 1), 𝐷1 is a linear function of 𝐷0. So Equation (6) becomes  
𝐶1 =
1
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
{𝛹𝑌2 + 𝛹(1 + 𝑟𝑠)𝑌1 + 𝛹(1 + 𝑟𝑠)𝜆
𝑆𝑆1 + 𝛹(1 + 𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻𝐻𝑃1 + 𝛹(𝑟𝑠 − 𝑟𝑑1)𝐷1 −
𝛹[1 + 𝑟𝑑0 + (1 + 𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0](?̅?𝐻𝑃1 − 𝐷1)}       (9) 
Thus, for a liquidity-constrained household: 
 
𝜕𝐶1
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝐷1
=
𝛹(𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑑1)
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
+
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
,      
𝜕𝐶1
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕(1−?̅?)𝐻𝑃0
= (1 − ?̅?)[
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
− ?̅?
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
]    
 
For liquidity-constrained households, the sensitivity of consumption to a home-equity loan 
decreases with the home-equity loan interest rate (𝑟𝑑1), but increases with the first-mortgage 
interest rate (𝑟𝑑0). Regarding the conventional housing wealth effect, in addition to the initial 
mortgage rate (𝑟𝑑0) and the housing-price growth rate (𝑔ℎ), the sensitivity of consumption (𝐶1) to 
home value netting debt also depends on maximum loan to value ratio (?̅?). It can be shown that 
with the increase in ?̅?, consumption would be less sensitive to net home equity. From the optimal 
decision rules of the household, we derive the following propositions. 
 
Proposition 1: The elasticity of consumption to extracted home equity is larger for liquidity-
constrained households than for liquidity-unconstrained households.  
Appendix 1 provides the proof.  
 
Proposition 2: The elasticity of consumption to extractable home equity is smaller for liquidity-
constrained households than for liquidity-unconstrained households, given that the elasticity of 
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consumption to extractable home equity and the elasticity of consumption to extracted home equity 
are both positive for liquidity-unconstrained households, which means that 𝑟𝑠 >
𝑟𝑑1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜕𝐶1
𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕(𝐻𝑃0−𝐷0−𝐷1)
> 0.  
Appendix 1 provides the proof.  
 
4 Empirical Design and Data 
4.1 Empirical Identification  
Consumption can be affected by four factors: income; financial assets (stocks, bonds, etc.); home 
equity; and the amount of extracted home equity. We estimate the effect of these variables on total 
consumption in logarithmic form. As previously discussed, we following Cooper (2010) and 
define extracted home equity for each household as (1) the increase in total mortgage balance for 
a non-mover or (2) the decrease in home equity for a mover:  
𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = {
𝑀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1   𝑖𝑓  𝑀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 − 𝑀𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1 > 0  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 0
𝐻𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝐻𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦                     𝑖𝑓 𝐻𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝐻𝑖,𝑠,𝑡−1
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 < 0     𝑎𝑛𝑑   𝑚𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 1 
0                                                                                                                 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 , (15) 
where HEEi,s,t  is the (dollar) amount of extracted home equity for household i in state s at period 
t, 8 Mi,s,t is the mortgage balance for household i in state s at period t, and 𝐻𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
 represents home 
equity netting all debts for household i in state s at period t. movei,s,t is a binary indicator with a 
                                                        
8 Origination fees, prepayment penalties, and closing costs can affect the amount of cash extracted by refinancing 
loans. However, as these data are not available in PSID or HMDA, extracted home equity in our empirical estimation 
is measured as the increase in the mortgage balance for non-movers and decrease in net home equity for movers. We 
acknowledge that these additional costs can systematically overestimate the cash available for extraction. The result 
could be a downward bias, such that the actual consumption effect of extracted home equity may be even larger than 
our estimation.  
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value of 1 when the household moves in the previous year, and 0 when the household does not 
move.  
 
One concern is that the co-movement between extracted home equity and consumption may be 
driven by common macroeconomic shocks, which are not necessarily related to changes in the 
credit constraints of households. We use an IV approach to correct for any link between extracted 
home equity and consumption. Furthermore, as the home-equity loan amount is left-censored, we 
use a Tobit model in our first-stage estimation: 
 
ℎ𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝐸 =  {
𝑍𝑠,𝑡−1𝛿 + 𝑊𝑖,𝑠,𝑡𝜓 + 𝜉𝑖,𝑠,𝑡   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 > 0
0                                                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
,  (16) 
 
where ℎ𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝐸  stands for the log value of extracted home equity for household i in state s at period t. 
Given that the amount of extracted home equity can be zero, we define ℎ𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝐸 = ln (𝐻𝐸𝐸𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 + 1). 
𝑊𝑖,𝑠,𝑡  is a vector of control variables for household i in state s at period t, including each 
household’s income, financial wealth, home equity, mortgage payment, age, marital status, and 
number of children. The control variables ensure the IV’s conditional exogeneity. 𝜓 is a vector of 
coefficients. The IV, Zs,t-1, is selected to reflect the aggregate credit supply of financial institutions 
to refinance loan applicants in state s at period t-1. 𝛿 is the associated coefficient. We consider 
three proxies for the IV: (1) the proportion of refinance loan amounts to total loan amounts for 
each state and each period; (2) the state-level refinancing-loan denial ratio; and (3) the difference 
in the state-level denial ratio between refinance loans and home purchase loans. As these IVs 
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measure the credit supply in past periods (period t-1), they are exogenous to individual household 
consumption decisions in the next period (period t). In addition, as the IVs are aggregate state-
level variables, they are unlikely to be correlated with the financial decisions or financial plans of 
individual households. However, concerns may still arise that macroeconomic shocks may affect 
household credit demand. This can lead to endogenous co-movement between the loan supply and 
household consumption decisions. Therefore, we include the difference in the refinance-loan 
denial ratio and home purchase-loan denial ratio as an instrument. We argue that the difference in 
the denial ratio is independent of macro shocks, as the loan-denial ratio for both refinance loans 
and home purchase loans will be subject to the same shock and will likely respond similarly. 
Therefore, we argue that the instrument based on the state-level aggregate credit supply in the last 
period—and especially the difference in the loan-denial ratio—satisfies the conditional exogeneity 
requirement for a valid instrument.  
 
In the second stage, we include the predicted level of extracted home equity from the first-stage 
model in the following equation9:   
𝑐𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑦𝑦𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑓𝑓𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛼ℎℎ𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛼ℎ𝑒𝑒ℎ̂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝐸 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑠,𝑡𝜑 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑠,𝑡,   (17) 
where 𝑐𝑖,𝑠,𝑡 stands for the logged consumption for household i in state s at period t. 𝑦𝑖,𝑠,𝑡, 𝑓𝑖,𝑠,𝑡, 
ℎ𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 and ℎ̂𝑖,𝑠,𝑡
𝐻𝐸𝐸  are the log-transformed income, financial wealth, extractable home equity, and 
                                                        
9 Wooldridge (2002) introduces a two-stage IV estimator that is suitable for IV estimation with a nonlinear regression 
in the first stage, as is the case with our model. Standard errors of the regression coefficients are corrected according 
to Wooldridge (2002).  
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the instrumented version of extracted home equity for household i at period t, respectively. The 
extractable home equity is measured as the net home equity excluding all mortgage debt 
outstanding, and the instrumented extracted home equity10 is based on the first-stage regression 
predicted value. The coefficient 𝛼ℎ quantifies the conventional housing wealth—that is, how the 
perception of extractable home equity affects consumption. The coefficient 𝛼ℎ𝑒𝑒 is the marginal 
effect of extracted home equity on consumption, which reflects the collateral effect of housing 
wealth. 𝑋𝑖,𝑠,𝑡  includes household-level total debt payment, age, marital status, and number of 
children.  
 
4.2 Data 
Our cross-sectional samples come from the PSID database, which is an ongoing, nationally 
representative sample of more than 5,000 U.S. households since1968. Family survey data were 
published annually before 2000, and have been published every two years since.11 Our sample 
covers the period 1999–2013. We concentrate on those households that own a house, have positive 
income and stock holdings, and whose nondurable consumption is 500–500,000 USD, annually. 
                                                        
10 Empirical results are based on the instrumented extracted home equity. For expositional simplicity, we will use 
“extracted home equity” going forward.  
11 The two-year lag may lead to underestimation of the consumption effect of home-equity extraction. With the two-
year lag, extracted home equity is defined as the increase in mortgage indebtedness since the first mortgage over the 
last two years for non-movers, or the decrease in home equity over the last two years for movers. However, household 
consumption is only for the past year. If, over the two-year period, a household extracts home equity in the first year 
and also consumes the converted cash in the first year, the extracted home equity is counted but the consumption is 
not observed. In other words, the two-year lag means that any impact of extracted home equity on consumption would 
be stronger if part of the extracted home equity is consumed in the first year. 
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These selection criteria are also used in previous literature (Guo and Hardin, 2014). Consumption 
includes durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. Durable goods consist of vehicles, home 
repairs, furnishings, and vacations; nondurable goods include such items as food and clothes. 
Services cover expenses on energy, medical care, insurance, education, childcare, and others. 
Income is the household’s labor income plus transfer payments from the previous year. Because 
labor income reflects the previous year, we argue that the income endogeneity problem discussed 
by Cooper (2010) will not lead to biased results in our study. Financial wealth is defined as net 
stock value. Housing wealth is calculated as household home value, excluding mortgage balances. 
Consumption, income, wealth, and mortgage data are deflated using the consumption price index, 
with 1982–84 as the base period.  
 
Data on state-level refinance-loan denial ratio and refinance loan amount come from the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database, which reports the dollar amount of denied loan 
applications and total approved applications for counties in more than 300 MSAs. We aggregate 
denied and approved loan amounts in counties for each state and calculate the average state-level 
loan-denial ratio.  
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data. As can be seen, consumption rose by 35% from 
1999 to 2013 and peaked in 2007. Compared to income and stock, which show a more stable 
increase, home equity has a stronger fluctuation in value during this period. Average home equity 
nearly doubled from 1999 to 2007, but decreased in the following period. The amount of home-
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equity extraction shows a pattern similar to that of home equity. In 2001, around 32.9% of 
homeowners extracted home equity, with an average amount of 10,024 USD. By 2005, the 
percentage of homeowners with home equity loans increased to 39.5%, and the average amount 
rose to nearly 15,908 USD. After 2005, lenders started to reduce their exposure to the housing 
market, so the percentage of households with home-equity extraction dropped. In 2013, only 23% 
of homeowners extracted equity from their home, and the average amount dropped to 5,800 USD. 
The increase in home-equity extraction may be related to the relaxed credit supply for refinance 
loans, as we can see that the proportion of refinance loans peaked at 72% in 2003. In 2003, the 
loan-denial ratio was also very low; only 14% of home purchase loans and 23% of refinance loans 
were rejected. In 2009, however, the home purchase-loan denial ratio rose to 26% and the 
refinance-loan denial ratio to 78%.  
<< Table 1 about here>> 
 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Baseline Results 
Table 2 reports results of the first-stage Tobit regression for the outcome home-equity extraction 
with alternative IVs. The state-level proportion of refinance loans to total loans is statistically 
significant and positively related to the amount of extracted home equity. This result is consistent 
with the view that a relaxed credit supply for refinance loans allows for more home-equity 
extraction (Model i, Table 2). Loan-denial ratios are also a widely used IV to proxy for credit 
supply. As shown in the next column of Table 2, extraction of home equity is statistically 
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significant and negatively related to the state-level refinance-loan denial ratio (Model ii, Table 2). 
In Model iii, we use the difference in the denial ratio between refinance loans and home purchase 
loans as the IV to remove the impact of common macroeconomic factors on the supply of refinance 
loans. The coefficient remains significant (Model iii, Table 2), but is smaller in magnitude than 
the coefficient for the refinance-loan denial ratio.  
 
<< Table 2 about here >> 
 
Table 3 reports the second-stage regression results for the log of total consumption. The three 
columns correspond to the alternative estimations from the Tobit first-stage models in Table 2. In 
all specifications, consumption is statistically significant and positively related to income, stock, 
and home equity, which is consistent with previous literature. In addition to this consistency with 
prior studies, we observe a significant and positive impact on consumption for age, number of 
children, and the marriage indicator. The coefficient on age squared is significant and negative, 
implying a nonlinear relationship between age and consumption. The parameter of interest—the 
coefficient on extracted home equity—is significant and positively related to consumption. This 
confirms a significant and positive consumption channel for extracted home equity. If we compare 
the size of the coefficients of home equity and extracted home equity, we see that the elasticity of 
consumption to home equity is larger than that for extracted home equity.12 Specifically, a 1% 
                                                        
12 As our paper focuses on the collateral effect, the IV approach is applied to extracted home equity. As home value 
may also be endogenous to consumption, the impact of home equity on consumption could be overestimated.  
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increase in home equity is associated with a more than 12% increase in consumption, while a 1% 
increase in extracted home equity is related to an approximately 3% increase in consumption.  
 
<< Table 3 about here >> 
 
As income, home equity, stocks, and extracted home equity are log-transformed variables, we 
convert the estimated coefficients to the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) by multiplying 
the coefficient by the respective average consumption wealth ratio. 13  While the estimated 
coefficients measure the relative percentage change in consumption, MPC measures the absolute 
dollar change. This is partially reflective of the starting levels of the consumption wealth ratio used 
as a reference. These results are reported in Table 4. Consistent with previous studies, financial 
wealth has a smaller MPC than housing wealth. On average, a one-dollar increase in stock wealth 
is associated with about a 0.8-cent increase in consumption, which is much lower than the housing 
wealth MPC.  Income also has a strong impact on consumption. The estimated income MPC is 
around 4 cents, which is smaller than estimates reported in studies using aggregate data (for 
example, Lettau and Ludvigson 2001; Duca et al. 2010). However, it is similar to results based on 
household survey data, as reported by Guo and Hardin (2014) and Cooper (2010).  
 
                                                        
13 For example, the MPC for home equity is calculated as the respective coefficient multiplied by the ratio of average 
consumption to average home equity, and the MPC for extracted home equity is calculated as the respective coefficient 
multiplied by the ratio of average consumption to average extracted home equity.  
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Although the estimated coefficients imply a larger impact for home equity on consumption at the 
relative level, the converted MPC of an extra dollar of extracted home equity is more than twice 
the increase in home equity. As shown in Table 4, a one-dollar increase in housing wealth (i.e., 
home equity) is associated with an approximately 4-cent increase in consumption. In contrast, an 
extra dollar of extraction from home equity is related to an increase in consumption of between 8 
and 12 cents. Economically, the collateral effect due to extracted home equity plays a larger role 
in stimulating consumption than the conventional housing wealth effect. However, the estimated 
MPC is still smaller in size than what has been reported in previous studies. For example, using a 
similar database, Cooper (2010) finds that a one-dollar increase in equity extraction leads to as 
much as a 54-cent increase in household expenditures. Based on survey data, Greenspan and 
Kennedy (2008) show that around 32 cents out of one dollar of extracted home equity was used 
for consumption over the period 1991–2005.  Belsky and Prakken (2004) report that around 16 to 
18 cents out of a dollar of extracted home equity was used for personal consumption during the 
period 1998–2002.   
 
There are two possible explanations for the magnitude differences found for the collateral effect. 
First, we use IVs to address the potential endogeneity in using extracted home equity and 
consumption. Our estimated MPC is the causal effect of home-equity extraction on consumption. 
Second, we use a log-transformed measure of extracted home equity rather than the dollar amount 
in the regression. The converted MPC, therefore, can be affected by the reference level of the 
consumption and extracted home-equity ratios used in the conversion. Interestingly, by using the 
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2013 ratio as the reference—instead of the average ratio between 2001 and 2013—the MPC for 
extracted home equity is around 20 cents.  
 
<< Table 4 about here >> 
 
5.2 Liquidity-constrained and unconstrained households 
As shown in our theoretical model, liquidity-constrained and unconstrained households may differ 
in terms of their consumption behavior. We examine this issue empirically by segmenting 
households into groups according to (1) total wealth, (2) proportion of liquid wealth to total wealth, 
(3) debt-to-income ratio, and (4) loan-to-value ratio. Liquidity-constrained households presumably 
possess less liquid wealth, higher debt-to-income ratios, and higher loan-to-value ratios. They may 
also have less total wealth. Due to the skewed distribution of wealth in the U.S., such segmentation 
also enables us to take a closer look at spending patterns and consumption channels across 
consumers.  
 
Table 5 reports the results when we segment the entire sample into liquidity-constrained and 
unconstrained households according to their total wealth. We use three thresholds to define 
liquidity-constrained households: the bottom 50%, 25%, and 10% of all households ranked by 
their net wealth. After identifying constrained households based on the thresholds, the remaining 
households are considered unconstrained. All estimations are based on the third specification in 
the Tobit regression shown in Table 2 (Model iii), in which we use the difference in the denial 
 26 
 
ratio between refinance and home-purchase loans as the IV. Results based on the other two 
specifications in Table 2 are remarkably robust.14 
 
As shown in Table 5, elasticity of consumption to income is relatively consistent across the three 
threshold cases. However, we observe that the effect on financial and housing wealth differs 
between wealthier and less wealthy households. For all alternative wealth thresholds, the elasticity 
of consumption to financial wealth and extractable home equity are much larger for wealthier 
households. For the 10% least wealthy households, the coefficients for financial wealth and 
extractable housing wealth are only around half that for unconstrained households. In contrast, a 
significant impact of extracted home equity only appears for the 10% least wealthy households. A 
1% increase in extracted home equity is associated with a 0.10% increase in consumption, which 
implies a 30-cent MPC.  
 
<< Table 5 about here>> 
 
In Table 6, we focus on liquid wealth and find similar results as compared to the segmentation by 
total wealth. Liquid wealth includes savings, cash, and checking account balances. Liquidity-
constrained households tend to possess a smaller proportion of liquid wealth in their total wealth. 
As shown in Table 6, the home-equity coefficient for unconstrained households is larger than for 
                                                        
14 Results based on the other specifications are available from the authors upon request. 
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liquidity-constrained households. For households with less than 0.6% of liquid wealth (the bottom 
10th percentile), a 1% increase in extractable home equity is associated with a 0.13% increase in 
consumption, implying an MPC of 4.5 cents. Meanwhile, for the rest of the households, a 1% 
increase in extractable home equity is related to a 0.89% increase in consumption, which is around 
2.3 cents of MPC.  Regarding the coefficient for extracted home equity, liquidity-constrained 
households exhibit a larger elasticity. For households with less than 0.6% of liquid wealth (10th 
percentile of least liquid wealth), the elasticity of consumption to extracted home equity is around 
three times larger than for the rest of the households, while the MPC of extracted home equity is 
more than two times higher.  
 
<< Table 6 about here >> 
 
We further examine the issue of liquidity with two widely used metrics for underwriting household 
borrowing capacity: debt-to-income ratio (DTI) and loan-to-value ratio (LTV). The former is 
calculated as the household’s monthly debt payments divided by income.15 The latter is estimated 
as the outstanding mortgage balance divided by total home value (Hurst and Stafford (2004). 
Higher values of DTI or LTV imply that a household faces borrowing constraints that, in turn, 
impact consumption. Analogous to the thresholds we used previously, we define liquidity-
                                                        
15 In the PSID database, household payments to credit cards or student loans are not available. Our debt payment, 
therefore, only includes mortgage and car payments. We acknowledge that this debt-payment measure may 
underestimate the actual payment by households. 
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constrained households as those with DTIs or LTVs higher than the 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles. 
Results are reported in Tables 7 and 8. 
 
The coefficient on extracted home equity is higher for households with higher DTI and LTV (the 
top 50%, 25%, and 10% of the sample ranked by DTI or LTV) as compared to all less-constrained 
households. For example, when household DTI is above 47%, the elasticity of extracted home 
equity on consumption is 0.100, which is more than three times larger than for households with 
DTI below 47%, where the coefficient is only 0.031. A similar finding is evident in the results 
based on LTV segmentation, in which the impact of home-equity extraction is insignificant for 
households with LTV higher than 80% LTV (i.e., higher than the 90th percentile). When we 
consider the cohort of households with the highest DTI (from the top 10% to the top 50% of 
households), we see that the coefficient of home-equity extraction decreases from 0.100 to 0.041. 
When we look at the cohort of households with the LTV rising from 0.4 to 0.8, the coefficient of 
home-equity extraction rises from 0.024 to 0.134; meanwhile, the impact of a percentage increase 
in home equity drops from 0.090 to 0.026. 
 
<< Table 7 about here >> 
<< Table 8 about here >> 
 
Our empirical results confirm the prediction of Proposition 1: Extracted home equity is more 
important for liquidity-constrained households. As liquidity-constrained households may have 
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only limited access to uncollateralized borrowing, they often choose to tap into their home equity 
when they want to increase consumption. When the LTV is more than 80%, the home equity or 
conventional wealth effect of housing is statistically insignificant, whereas the home-equity 
extraction or collateral effect is highly significant, both statistically and economically. For example, 
a percentage increase in extracted home equity results in a 13.4% increase in consumption, which 
implies a 25-cent growth in consumption triggered by a one-dollar increase in extracted home 
equity.  
 
Consistent with the prediction of Proposition 2, the elasticity of consumption to home equity (i.e., 
housing wealth effect) for unconstrained households is larger than the effect of home-equity 
extraction. When the LTV is below 40%, home-equity extraction is not statistically significant. 
For unconstrained households, housing affects their consumption mainly through the conventional 
wealth effect. Households that are unconstrained by liquidity, apart from secured loans such as 
home-equity loans, can draw on more liquid assets or rely on uncollateralized borrowing, such as 
credit cards, for consumption. 
  
5.3 Additional Results and Robustness Tests  
In this section, we provide additional results for robustness and to check the validity of our 
instrument. In addition, we seek to further support our findings by reporting the results of a 
falsification test based on renters. First, we investigate whether wealth effects and consumption 
channels differ between durable and nondurable consumption. To do this, we segment households 
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by LTV as a proxy for constraints and report results for durable and nondurable consumption 
separately. Table 9 reports the results for durable goods, nondurable goods, and services. We 
observe variations among the three types of consumption by dividing the sample into households 
with LTV higher or lower than 80%. Consistent with findings based on total consumption, the 
impact of home equity decreases with an increase in household leverage. For households with LTV 
higher than 80%, home equity has an insignificant impact on durable consumption. This result is 
consistent with Bostic et al. (2009), who show that for credit-constrained households, fluctuations 
in house values are not significant in determining durable consumption.  
 
Regarding the collateral effect, extracted home equity clearly contributes to the consumption of 
durable goods by liquidity-constrained households. As purchases of durable goods, such as cars 
and household appliances, are more likely to be financed by borrowing, extracted home equity 
plays a more important role for durable consumption than for nondurable consumption, as seen in 
the MPCs reported in Table 9. This effect is especially evident for extracted home equity. For 
households with LTV higher than 80%, one dollar extracted from home equity is related to a 34.6-
cent increase in consumption of durable goods.  
 
<< Table 9 about here >> 
 
As households may use extracted home equity to consolidate other debts, we include the 
household’s first mortgage as a control variable in both the first- and second-stage regressions. 
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The second and third columns in Table 10 report results for the second-stage regression, which, in 
general, remain robust for home equity and extracted home equity. First mortgage has an 
insignificant impact on households’ consumption.  
 
In addition, we also control for household income shocks. Households that received a negative 
income shock and have few liquid assets to buffer the shock are more likely to refinance and extract 
home equity for consumption purposes, all else equal. We follow Hurst and Stafford (2014) and 
use unemployment spells as our measure of income shocks. We construct a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if either the household head or the spouse experiences an unemployment spell 
between 1999 and 2013. Results are report in Table 10. The consumption effect of extracted home 
equity remains robust for constrained households.  
 
Lastly, we acknowledge that concerns may arise regarding the endoegeneity between our 
instruments and consumption. This may arise from the coincidence of market booms and busts or 
changes in credit limits. To address this concern, we conduct a falsification check using renters as 
our sample to investigate our instrument’s validity.16 As renters cannot borrow against home 
equity, the instrument (i.e., state-level refinancing loan supply) should not be a useful instrument 
for predicting the consumption of renters. If the instrumented extracted home equity can also 
explain renter consumption, this will imply that the instrument of state-level refinancing loan 
                                                        
16 We gratefully acknowledge an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this approach. 
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supply is not valid, as it overestimates the true relationship.   
 
In the falsification test, we first calculate the instrumented extracted home equity for renters. Next, 
we regress renter consumption on the instrumented extracted home equity. As home equity is 
necessary for the calculation of home-equity extraction, we simulate a counterfactual home-equity 
value for renters by assuming that they are able to purchase their rented home by borrowing. The 
counterfactual home equity is calculated as the annual rent payment divided by the 30-year 
mortgage rate in that year.  
 
Once the home-equity value is set for renters, we simulate a counterfactual extracted home equity 
for renters, using the IV—state-level refinancing loan credit supply—and other variables for 
renters using Equation (16).  The coefficient for the simulation is from the first-stage regression 
for homeowners. In the second stage, we regress the actual consumption of renters on the 
counterfactual extracted home equity and counterfactual home equity. Other variables, such as 
income and stock wealth, are based on their actual values. Regression results are reported in Table 
10. The elasticity of consumption to income and stock wealth remains relatively robust; however—
and importantly—the elasticities for counterfactual home equity and extracted home equity are 
insignificant. The consumption of renters is indeed uncorrelated to the instrumented extracted 
home equity.  
 
<< Table 10 about here >> 
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6 Conclusion 
The recent economic boom and bust have raised important questions about the relationship 
between housing wealth and consumption. Prior studies find that, since the mid-1990s, 
consumption has become more sensitive to housing wealth. However, significant disagreements 
persist regarding the causes of this increased sensitivity. Identifying the channels through which 
housing wealth affects consumption is essential in order to understand the economic implications 
of home-price fluctuations and a household’s ability to borrow against its home.  
 
Our paper develops a household-consumption decision model that predicts different consumption 
effects of extracted and extractable home equity. Based on household survey data from the PSID 
database from 1999 to 2013, our empirical results suggest that the collateral effect of home-equity 
extraction is economically relevant to co-movement between housing wealth and consumption. 
On average, a one-dollar increase in housing equity is associated with a 4-cent increase in 
consumption, while the marginal propensity to consume for home-equity credit is around 8 cents.  
 
The contributions of this study are further extended by our theoretical and empirical results on 
consumption patterns across liquidity-constrained and unconstrained households. The 
conventional housing wealth effect remains an important channel by which housing wealth affects 
consumption. However, this is primarily the case for unconstrained households: The increase in 
home values allows them to feel more confident about their financial status, and they spend more. 
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In contrast, for households that have limited access to uncollateralized credit, home-equity credit 
offers an alternative way to finance consumption. For liquidity-constrained households, which 
typically have higher debt-to-income or loan-to-value ratios, a one-dollar increase in extracted 
home equity is associated with an increase of up to 30 cents in consumption.  
 
This new evidence regarding the home-equity extraction channel for consumption, especially in 
the case of constrained households, contributes to our understanding of the role housing wealth 
has played in recent economic cycles. The impact of home-equity extraction, along with 
exceptionally low rates for home-equity credit, is clearly an important driver in the marginal 
propensity to consume—and, for some consumers, to abruptly curtail consuming.   
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Table 1 Statistics summary  
 All 
years 
1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 
Mean          
35,130 27,279 28,415 36,367 36,972 37,655 35,965 35,373 36,827 
16,442 14,235 14,032 13,554 18,506 16,914 17,472 18,233 18,170 
8,171 7,006 6,815 6,912 8,200 10,494 8,850 7,623 8,587 
21,084 10,023 13,394 29,259 20,018 21,212 20,635 21,316 23,362 
Income 58,865 56,111 58,216 55,947 57,318 58,325 58,624 61,873 65,227 
Home equity 102,193 68,620 80,034 92,336 114,450 124,239 103,609 99,010 105,090 
Stock  95,909 92,307 93,131 95,571 95,152 87,636 79,336 104,489 128,687 
Total mortgage balance 61,150 49,926 52,617 58,723 66,347 65,397 64,075 61,262 61,345 
Extracted home equity 10,506 - 10,024 11,495 15,908 11,594 8,822 6,590 5,806 
% households  32.2% - 32.9% 39.6% 39.5% 32.7% 26.4% 23.0% 23.2% 
Debt payment  6,669 6,203 7,064 6,599 7,035 6,977 6,544 6,072 5,808 
Age 50 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 
No. of children 0.989 1.164 1.179 1.006 1.024 0.936 0.952 0.883 0.804 
Marriage 0.880 0.891 0.880 0.870 0.878 0.882 0.882 0.886 0.884 
Income shock  4% 5% 3% 6% 5% 3% 5% 6% 4% 
% ref. loan 60% 60% 61% 72% 48% 48% 69% 65% 59% 
Loan denial ratio 17% 17% 13% 14% 20% 26% 17% 16% 15% 
Ref. loan denial ratio 41% 38% 26% 23% 52% 78% 35% 34% 30% 
          
Standard Deviation           
Consumption 40,071 23,901 21,867 74,409 26,095 28,473 39,229 27,870 28,144 
Durable 17,109 17,488 14,308 13,156 16,426 16,413 22,528 19,339 17,480 
Nondurable 14,533 13,091 12,735 13,818 12,736 15,065 19,302 11,290 15,366 
Services 55,450 9,666 12,464 130,005 17,327 17,773 21,586 21,390 23,703 
Income 85,956 57,258 62,141 88,373 89,092 65,030 65,761 79,218 148,395 
Home equity 126,947 81,026 96,799 107,920 142,520 159,809 136,874 105,918 116,121 
Stock  577,922 539,964 791,919 730,850 639,774 248,284 323,214 414,063 516,775 
Total mortgage balance 73,575 56,707 62,351 68,743 78,134 82,133 75,677 69,683 77,438 
Extracted home equity 32,658 - 37,668 27,704 39,619 32,545 34,003 24,782 19,867 
% households  0.47 - 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.42 0.42 
Debt payment  7,631 6,341 9,062 6,886 8,350 8,339 6,696 6,164 5,888 
Age 13 13 12 13 13 13 14 13 14 
No. of children 1.151 1.217 1.275 1.102 1.127 1.084 1.170 1.133 1.080 
Married 0.325 0.312 0.325 0.337 0.327 0.323 0.323 0.318 0.320 
Income shock  21% 21% 16% 24% 22% 17% 21% 24% 20% 
% ref. loan 11.8% 10% 8.9% 6.2% 7.8% 8.4% 6.7% 6.9% 6.4% 
Loan denial ratio 7.2% 5.5% 3.6% 3.4% 5.2% 10.2% 5.3% 4.1% 3.6% 
Ref. loan denial ratio 21.6% 9.7% 8.2% 5.7% 14.6% 14.4% 10.5% 8.0% 6.3% 
          
Notes: Consumption is the total consumption in USD Durable, nondurable, and services are consumption in durable 
goods, nondurable goods, and services, respectively. Income stands for household income. Home equity is the home 
value excluding all debts, and stock stands for net stock wealth. Extracted home equity stands for the dollar amount 
of extracted home equity. Mortgage stands for the household total mortgage balance, including first mortgage and 
other home equity credits. All variables are deflated using the consumption price index (with 1982–84 as the base 
period). % households denotes the percentage of households using extracted home equity. Debt payment is the total 
payment for all debts. Age stands for the age of household head. No. of children denotes the number of children in the 
household. Married is a dummy variable with 1 for married and 0 otherwise. Income shock is an indicator variable 
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taking the value of 1 if either the household head or the spouse experienced an unemployment spell in the past year, 
and zero otherwise.  % ref. loan stands for the refinance loan amounts to total mortgage loans percentage. Loan 
denial ratio denotes the state-level denial ratio of home-purchase loans, and Ref. loan denial ratio denotes the state-
level denial ratio of refinance loans. % ref. loan, Loan denial ratio, and Ref. loan denial ratio, which are at state 
aggregate levels, are from HMDA data.  All other variables, including home equity, extracted home equity, and total 
mortgage balance, are at the household level and from the PSID database. 
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Table 2 First-stage regression of extracted home equity  
  Tobit  
 (i) (ii) (iii) 
6.956***   
(1.480)   
 -5.711***  
 (1.171)  
  -2.960*** 
  (1.222) 
0.327*** 0.321*** 0.316*** 
(0.144) (0.141) (0.143) 
-0.059 -0.072 -0.051 
(0.120) (0.119) (0.121) 
0.126*** 0.124*** 0.122*** 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Log of Payment  1.445*** 1.447*** 1.447*** 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.042) 
Log of Age  -0.569*** -0.558*** -0.567*** 
 (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) 
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
-0.158* -0.180** -0.176* 
(0.091) (0.092) (0.091) 
Married  -0.123 -0.116 -0.103 
 (0.325) (0.326) (0.325) 
Const 7.026*** 5.360*** 6.956*** 
 (2.300) (2.210) (2.174) 
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 19132 19132 19132 
LL -28861 -28862  -28859 
Notes: This table reports the results of the first-stage regression for the IV estimator (Wooldridge, 
2002). The dependent variable is defined as ln(HEEit + 1). HEE is the home equity that has been 
extracted by individual households and is defined by Equation (15).  Home Equity stands for home 
value net of all debts.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 3 Second-stage regression of total consumption for all observations  
 
  2SLS  
  (i)  (ii)  (iii) 
0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
0.120*** 0.120*** 0.120*** 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
0.044*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
0.036*** 0.023* 0.027* 
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
-0.010* -0.005 -0.006 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
0.026*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Log of Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
No. of Children 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Married 0.273*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Const 6.034*** 6.000*** 5.985*** 
 (0.077) (0.095) (0.092) 
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Obs. 19132 19132 19132 
Adjusted R2 0.2883 0.2881 0.2882 
    
Notes: This table reports the results of the second-stage regression for the IV regression (Wooldridge 
2002).  It examines the impact of extracted home equity on consumption. Dependent variable is 
logged total consumption in every two years from 2001 to 2013. Income, stock, home equity, and 
payment stand for households’ income, net stock value, home value net of all debt, and annual 
payment to all debts, respectively. Instrumented extracted home equity is the predicted extracted 
home equity from the first-stage Tobit regression using the instrument of state-level aggregate 
refinancing loan supply. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 MPC for all observations  
  (i)  (ii) (iii) 
Income 0.039 0.039 0.039 
Home Equity  0.041 0.041 0.041 
Stock 0.008 0.008 0.008 
Instrumented Extracted 
Home Equity   
0.119 0.078 0.089 
    
Notes: This table reports the marginal propensity to consume (MPC) of income, 
home equity, stocks, and extracted home equity from Table 3 and the three models 
with different IVs. Income, stock, home equity, and extracted home equity stand for 
household income, net stock value, home value net of all debt, and home equity that 
has already been extracted by households, respectively. MPCs are calculated by 
multiplying the respective coefficient by the corresponding average consumption 
wealth ratio over the period 2001–2013. 
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Table 5 Regression of Total Consumption for Households Segmented by Proportion of Net 
Wealth   
 
50th Percentile 
  
25th Percentile 
 
10th Percentile 
  
 
Below 
<198,664 
Above 
≥198,664 
Below 
<87,923 
Above 
≥87,923 
Below 
<39,953 
Above 
≥39,953 
Coef.       
Log of Income 0.132*** 0.115*** 0.178*** 0.126*** 0.159*** 0.134*** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.021) (0.006) 
Log of Home Equity  0.051*** 0.137*** 0.041*** 0.125*** 0.060*** 0.122*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.005) 
Log of Stock 0.030*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 0.044*** 0.025*** 0.045*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002) 
0.004 0.023 0.028 0.001 0.100*** 0.007 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.022) (0.044) (0.019) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MPC       
Income 0.041 0.033 0.053 0.037 0.046 0.040 
Home Equity  0.031 0.037 0.042 0.038 0.089 0.040 
Stock 0.027 0.004 0.037 0.007 0.078 0.008 
Instrumented Extracted 
Home Equity
 
0.014 0.079 0.086 0.003 0.307 0.025 
No. of Obs. 9567 9565 4307 14825 1911 17221 
Adjusted R2 0.2033 0.2383 0.2300 0.2477 0.2424 0.2578 
Notes: This table reports IV regression results (Wooldridge 2002) for liquidity-constrained 
households (in gray columns) and unconstrained households (in white columns). Liquidity-
constrained households are defined as households with net wealth less than 198,644 USD (50th 
percentile), 87,923 USD (25th percentile) and 39,953 USD (10th percentile). Households above the 
threshold are defined as unconstrained households.  Variables are as defined in Tables 3 and 4. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
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Table 6 Regression of Total Consumption for Households Segmented by Proportion of 
Liquid Wealth   
 
50th Percentile 
  
25th Percentile 
 
10th Percentile 
  
 
Below 
<6.2% 
Above 
≥6.2% 
Below 
<2% 
Above 
≥2% 
Below 
<0.6% 
Above 
≥0.6% 
Coef.       
Log of Income 0.133*** 0.124*** 0.142*** 0.129*** 0.164*** 0.128*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006) (0.016) (0.006) 
Log of Home Equity  0.108*** 0.135*** 0.107*** 0.125*** 0.089*** 0.126*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.012) (0.005) 
Log of Stock 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.043*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
0.092*** 0.022 0.104*** 0.017 0.104* 0.033** 
(0.028) (0.018) (0.034) (0.018) (0.057) (0.016) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MPC       
Income 0.043 0.034 0.047 0.037 0.049 0.038 
Home Equity  0.034 0.052 0.031 0.046 0.023 0.045 
Stock 0.006 0.011 0.005 0.010 0.004 0.009 
Instrumented Extracted 
Home Equity
 
0.297 0.077 0.317 0.057 0.288 0.111 
No. of Obs. 9561 9571 4783 14349 1976 17156 
Adjusted R2 0.2891 0.2978 0.3147 0.2845 0.4053 0.2789 
Notes: This table reports IV regression results (Wooldridge 2002) for liquidity-constrained 
households (in gray columns) and unconstrained households (in white columns). Liquidity-
constrained households are defined as households with liquid wealth less than 6.2% of net wealth 
(50th percentile), 2.0% of net wealth (25th percentile) and 0.6% of net wealth (10th percentile). 
Households above the threshold are defined as unconstrained households.  Variables are as defined 
in Tables 3 and 4. Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7 Regression of Total Consumption for Households Segmented by Debt to Income 
 
 
50th Percentile 
  
75th Percentile 
 
90th Percentile 
  
 
Above 
≥0.17 
Below 
<0.17 
Above 
≥0.30 
Below 
<0.30 
Above 
≥0.47 
Below 
<0.47 
Coef.       
Log of Income 0.158*** 0.109*** 0.055*** 0.189*** 0.008 0.189*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) (0.006) 
Log of Home Equity  0.144*** 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.119*** 0.099*** 0.111*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.015) (0.005) 
Log of Stock 0.034*** 0.053*** 0.062*** 0.037*** 0.074*** 0.039*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) 
0.041*** 0.030* 0.073*** 0.026* 0.100*** 0.031*** 
(0.018) (0.016) (0.023) (0.014) (0.042) (0.012) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MPC       
Income 0.040 0.040 0.026 0.050 0.005 0.053 
Home Equity  0.043 0.044 0.048 0.038 0.047 0.037 
Stock 0.004 0.018 0.022 0.006 0.022 0.007 
Instrumented Extracted 
Home Equity
 
0.204 0.073 0.155 0.106 0.258 0.108 
No. of Obs. 9566 9566 4776 14356 1939 17193 
Adjusted R2 0.3256 0.2500 0.2571 0.3074 0.2692 0.3002 
Notes: This table reports IV regression results (Wooldridge 2002) for liquidity-constrained 
households (in gray columns) and unconstrained households (in white columns). Liquidity-
constrained households are defined as households with debt to income ratio higher than 0.17 (50th 
percentile), 0.30 (75th percentile) and 0.47 (90th percentile). Households below the threshold are 
defined as unconstrained households.  Variables are as defined in Tables 3 and 4.  Standard 
deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 8 Regression of Total Consumption for Households Segmented by LTV 
 
 
50th Percentile 
  
75th Percentile 
 
90th Percentile 
  
 
Above 
≥0.4 
Below 
<0.4 
Above 
≥0.6 
Below 
<0.6 
Above 
≥0.8 
Below 
<0.8 
Coef.       
Log of Income 0.182*** 0.085*** 0.188*** 0.110*** 0.197*** 0.119*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.022) (0.006) 
Log of Home Equity  0.090*** 0.191*** 0.090*** 0.175*** 0.026** 0.167*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) 
Log of Stock 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.042*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) 
0.024* 0.012 0.057*** 0.035** 0.134*** 0.024 
(0.015) (0.032) (0.020) (0.017) (0.051) (0.015) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MPC       
Income 0.046 0.030 0.050 0.034 0.050 0.036 
Home Equity  0.054 0.048 0.098 0.050 0.053 0.055 
Stock 0.015 0.005 0.020 0.006 0.018 0.007 
Instrumented 
Extracted Home 
Equity
 
0.052 0.087 0.117 0.142 0.259 0.087 
No. of Obs. 9563 9486 4780 14352 1990 17142 
Adjusted R2 0.3041 0.2974 0.2878 0.2987 0.2974 0.2914 
Notes: This table reports IV regression results (Wooldridge 2002) for liquidity-constrained 
households (in gray columns) and unconstrained households (in white columns). Liquidity-
constrained households are defined as households with loan to value ratios higher than 0.4 (50th 
percentile), 0.6 (75th percentile) and 0.8 (90th percentile). Households below the threshold are defined 
as unconstrained households.  Variables are as defined in Tables 3 and 4. Standard deviations are 
in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 Regression by Consumption Type for Households Segmented by LTV 
 
Durable Goods  Nondurable Goods and 
Service  
 
Above 
≥0.8 
Below 
<0.8 
Above 
≥0.8 
Below 
<0.8 
Coef.     
Log of Income 0.165*** 0.121*** 0.200*** 0.119*** 
 (0.050) (0.013) (0.022) (0.006) 
Log of Home Equity  -0.007 0.187*** 0.035*** 0.154*** 
 (0.029) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) 
Log of Stock 0.074*** 0.065*** 0.007 0.018*** 
 (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) 
0.400*** -0.025 0.021 0.031 
(0.115) (0.034) (0.069) (0.020) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MPC     
Income 0.019 0.017 0.043 0.030 
Home Equity  -0.006 0.028 0.062 0.041 
Stock 0.020 0.005 0.004 0.003 
Instrumented Extracted 
Home Equity
 
0.346 -0.041 0.035 0.093 
No. of Obs. 1990 17142 1990 17142 
Adjusted R2 0.1628 0.1447 0.3254 0.2624 
Notes: This table reports IV regression results (Wooldridge 2002) for durable goods, and nondurable 
goods and services. Households are divided into two categories: liquidity-constrained households 
(in gray columns) and unconstrained households (in white columns). Liquidity-constrained 
households are defined as households with loan to value ratios higher than 0.8 or 80% LTV (the 90th 
percentile). Households below the threshold are defined as unconstrained households.  Variables are 
as defined in Tables 3 and 4.   Standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10 Alternative Specification for Households Segmented by LTV 
 
 First Mortgage  Income Shock  Falsification 
Test for 
Renters 
 
Above 
≥0.8 
Below 
<0.8 
Above 
≥0.8 
Below 
<0.8 
Coef.      
Log of Income 0.207*** 0.119*** 0.200*** 0.119*** 0.175*** 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.022) (0.006) (0.015) 
Log of Home Equity  0.034*** 0.169*** 0.025* 0.167*** 0.002 
 (0.013) (0.006) (0.013) (0.006) (0.004) 
Log of Stock 0.034*** 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.042*** 0.067*** 
 (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) 
0.154*** 0.025 0.133*** 0.024 -0.002 
(0.053) (0.015) (0.051) (0.015) (0.006) 
-0.005 -0.001    
(0.007) (0.002)    
  -0.017 0.001  
  (0.013) (0.006)  
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MPC      
Income 0.053 0.036 0.051 0.036 0.053 
Home Equity  0.068 0.054 0.053 0.054 0.001 
Stock 0.020 0.007 0.017 0.007 0.014 
Instrumented Extracted 
Home Equity
 
0.295 0.090 0.257 0.085 -0.007 
No. of Obs. 1990 17142 1990 17142 2432 
Adjusted R2 0.3009 0.2915 0.2977 0.2913 0.3241 
 
Notes: This table reports IV regression results (Wooldridge 2002) for three sets of robustness checks. 
In the first two sets, households are divided into two categories: liquidity-constrained households (in 
gray columns) and unconstrained households (in white columns). Liquidity-constrained households 
are defined as households with loan to value ratios higher than 0.8 or 80% LTV (90th percentile). 
Households below the threshold are defined as unconstrained households. Log of first mortgage is 
the log of first mortgage outstanding. Income shock is measured as an indicator variable with value 
of 1 when households experienced an unemployment spell in the past year, and zero otherwise. The 
remaining variables are as defined in Tables 3 and 4.  The third set of tests is shown in the last 
column. Here, a falsification test is reported for IV regression results using renters as the sample. 
Additional details pertaining to this test are found in the text.  Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition  
 
Proposition 1: The elasticity of consumption to extracted home equity is larger for liquidity-
constrained households than for liquidity-unconstrained households.  
 
Proof: As 𝑟𝑑0 > 0, 𝑟𝑠 > 0 and 𝛹 > 0, it can be shown that 
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
> 0. As a result, 
𝛹(𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑑1)
1+𝛹(1+𝑅)
+
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
>  
𝛹(𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑑1)
1+𝛹(1+𝑅)
, which implies 
𝜕𝐶1
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝐷1
>  
𝜕𝐶1
𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕𝐷1
.  
 
Proposition 2:  The elasticity of consumption to extractable home equity is smaller for liquidity-
constrained households than for liquidity-unconstrained households, given that the elasticity of 
consumption to extractable home equity and the elasticity of consumption to extracted home equity 
are both positive for liquidity-unconstrained households, which means that 𝑟𝑠 >
𝑟𝑑1, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝜕𝐶1
𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕(𝐻𝑃0−𝐷0−𝐷1)
> 0. 
 
Proof: For liquidity-constrained households, as 𝑟𝑠 > 0, 𝑟𝑑0 > 0 and 𝛹 > 0, it can be shown that 
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
> 0. As  1 > ?̅? > 0, we have 
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
− ?̅?
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
<
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
 . As 
a result  
𝜕𝐶1
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕(1−?̅?)𝐻𝑃1
=  (1 − ?̅?) [
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
− ?̅?
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
] < (1 − ?̅?)
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
<
 
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
  .  
 
For liquidity-constrained households, as 1 > 𝑟𝑠 > 0 and 1 > 𝑟𝑑0 > 0, it can be shown that 1 +
𝑟𝑑0 + (1 + 𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0 > 1. As 𝑟𝑠 − 𝑟𝑑1 < 1, we have  1 + 𝑟𝑑0 + (1 + 𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0 >  𝑟𝑠 − 𝑟𝑑1. As long as 
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𝑟𝑠 − 𝑟𝑑1 > 0, which means that the return on investment is larger than the debt interest rate, it can 
be shown that  
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
<
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹[𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑑1]
, which implies that 
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
−
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹[𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑑1]
<
0. So 
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆𝐻
+
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
−
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹[𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑑1]
<  
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆𝐻
 . As long as housing equity has a 
positive impact on consumption for liquidity-unconstrained households, which means that  
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆𝐻
+
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
−
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹[𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑑1]
> 0,  we have  
𝜕𝐶1
𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕(𝐻𝑃1−𝐷0−𝐷1)
=
1
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻+
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹[1+𝑟𝑑0+(1+𝑟𝑠)𝑟𝑑0]
−
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹[𝑟𝑠−𝑟𝑑1]
>
1
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻
=
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
 . Hence, we can see that  
𝜕𝐶1
𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕(𝐻𝑃1−𝐷0−𝐷1)
>
𝛹(1+𝑔ℎ)𝜆
𝐻
1+𝛹(1+𝑟𝑠)
>  
𝜕𝐶1
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑
𝜕(1−?̅?)𝐻𝑃1
  .  
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Appendix 2: Related Micro-level Studies17  
 
Study 
 
  
Theoretical 
framework    
Measure of housing wealth / 
home-equity extraction  
Measure of 
consumption  
Data sample Empirical 
methodology   
Conclusions 
Campbell 
and Cocco 
(2003) 
Life-cycle 
theory 
 
Predictable change in home 
value and unpredictable 
change in home value 
Nondurable 
consumption  
UK household-level 
data from the UK 
Family Expenditure 
Survey (FES) over 
the period 1988–2000 
Unbalanced 
panel 
regression   
On average, housing MPC is 7.7 
cents. Largest house price elasticity 
of consumption for older 
homeowners, and the smallest 
elasticity, insignificantly different 
from zero, for younger renters. 
Bostic, 
Gabriel and 
Painter 
(2005) 
— Household net home value  Total 
consumption, 
durable 
consumption, 
and 
nondurable 
consumption  
U.S. household-level 
data from the Survey 
of Consumer Finance 
and the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey 
over the period 
1989–2005 
Unbalanced 
panel 
regression   
Housing wealth has an MPC of 6 
cents, while financial wealth has an 
MPC of 2 cents. MPCs also 
diverge sharply across credit-
constrained and non-credit-
constrained households. 
Browning et 
al. (2013) 
— Expected house price change 
and unexpected house price 
change  
Total 
consumption  
Danish households 
data from 1987 to 
1996 
Panel 
regression  
No significant “pure” housing 
wealth effect, as household 
expenses are not significantly 
affected by unexpected house price 
change.  Home value affects 
consumption by the collateral 
effect, as consumption by young 
house owners reacts to house price 
changes after 1992 credit reform.  
Leth-
Petersen 
(2010) 
— Property value Total 
consumption  
Danish households 
data from 1987 to 
1996 
Difference in 
difference 
method  
After the 1992 credit reform, which 
enabled Danish households to use 
housing as collateral, consumption 
increases 1-4%. 
Cooper 
(2010) 
— Home-equity extraction is 
defined as the decrease in 
Non-housing 
consumption, 
U.S. household-level 
data from PSID 
Linear 
regression  
One dollar of equity extracted leads 
to no more than a 20-cent increase 
                                                        
17 For space consideration, this table focuses on empirical studies using household-level data.  
 51 
 
home equity for movers and 
increase in mortgage balance 
for non-movers.    
home 
improvement, 
and 
investment.    
database from 1999 
to 2009.  
in household expenditures. The 
amount of equity extracted that 
goes toward saving or home 
improvement investment is nearly 
double that of consumption. 
Hurst and 
Stafford  
(2014) 
Permanent 
income 
theory   
Home-equity extraction is 
defined as the decrease in 
home equity due to 
refinancing.   
Total wealth   U.S. household-level 
data from PSID 
database from 1989 
to 1996. Households 
are restricted to 
homeowners with 
mortgages and non-
movers. 
Median 
regression, 
Heckman 
two-stage 
regression.   
For every $1 of equity removed by 
the liquidity-constrained 
household, wealth declines by two-
thirds of a dollar. For liquidity non-
constrained households, no 
significant impact is found.  
Guo and 
Hardin 
(2014) 
Life-cycle/ 
Permanent 
income 
model    
Households’ net home value  Nondurable 
consumption  
U.S. household-level 
data from PSID 
database 
from 1994 to 2007 
Median 
regression  
1% increase in home equity is 
associated with a 0.02% increase in 
consumption. Wealth and its 
composition affects MPC. 
Households with higher net wealth 
have a higher housing wealth 
effect.  
Fan and 
Yavas 
(2017) 
— Household mortgage payment   Total 
consumption   
Chinese household-
level data from 
Urban Household 
Survey (UHS) 
database 
from 2002 to 2009 
Heckman 
two-stage 
regression. 
Households with a mortgage 
consume a higher portion of their 
income than households without a 
mortgage. 
 
 
 
